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I. INTRODUCTION
To the average reader, a statement surrounded by quotation
marks represents a statement directly asserted by the speaker. A
reader will give far more weight to such a statement than to an
author's rendition or paraphrase. A direct quotation makes an even
greater impression when it is found in a book about the speaker
himself and his relationship with others. Quotes attributed to the
speaker in such a book, which are not actually what the speaker
said, may send a different message than what the speaker meant to
convey. This unintended conveyance can take the following dis-
tinctive forms: First, the quote can be attributed to the speaker
and contain a false factual assertion. Second, a misquote can also
indicate an attitude or personal trait the speaker 'does not hold
merely by the fact that the assertion was attributed to him, regard-
less of the truth or falsity of the factual assertion. Although in cer-
tain situations misquotes of both types may be harmless, in others
it may be detrimental and actionable in a libel suit. In the recent
case of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court
recognized the need for relief in a situation involving altered quo-
tations and articulated a test of actual malice to be used in situa-
tions where a public figure is misquoted and harmed as a result.
This Note will start by looking at the history of libel law, the
rights such laws were created to protect, and the tension resulting
from the protection the First Amendment has granted the press.
The following section reviews the procedural history of the Masson
case and will describe in depth the test put forth by the Supreme
Court. The final section will analyze the effect this decision has on
libel law and its underlying rationale. In particular, that section
will show that the Masson holding continues the protection of
1. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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one's reputation while balancing this security with society's inter-
est in allowing the press to freely convey information to the public.
Additionally, this Note will establish that the unique interest in-
volved in a libel case concerning altered quotations, the speaker's
own freedom of speech, is adequately safeguarded. However, the
Note will show that the material alteration test enunciated in Mas-
son assumes that only one component exists to a person's interest
in reputation, and ignores the subcategorical character trait of be-
lievability. This Note then analyzes the consequences of this as-
sumption and proposes a solution to prevent large unwarranted
jury verdicts when only a speaker's believability is affected by a
misquotation.
II. HISTORY OF LIBEL LAW
A. Libel Law Generally as it Concerns Private Individuals
One's reputation in the community is of utmost importance. A
good reputation results in respect, trustworthiness, and a good
name, all factors contributing to a satisfying life among one's
peers. It is therefore not surprising that the law affords redress to a
person for harm suffered by false defamatory written statements
attacking his reputation.2 The tort of libel dates back to the Mid-
dle Ages, 3 and it is an action which remains viable today. The pri-
vate individual must be allowed to protect his reputation, and
there is no better way to deter people from harming another's rep-
utation through the publication of untrue statements than to allow
the private individual an opportunity to obtain compensation from
the author of the libelous statement. Under current libel law, resti-
tution may take two forms: (1) monetary compensation for the in-
jury in the form of damages, and (2) public vindication of the indi-
vidual's reputation.4 These remedies attempt to protect the
individual's reputation, and in many cases, juries award large ver-
dicts to the plaintiffs.5
An essential and distinct component of a person's reputation
not separately focused on in the history of libel law is believability,
or the degree to which a peer can rely on the truthfulness of a
person's statements. The importance and value of this component
2. See, e.g., CAL. PERSONAL RIGHTS CODE § 45 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ch. 770 (1991);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2911 (Callaghan 1988).
3. See generally Van Vechten Veeder, History of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REV. 546,
571 (1903) and R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99 (1949).
4. LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3, at 4-6 (1978).
5. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 64 (1966).
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as an aspect of reputation varies from individual to individual. For
example, when a person has a leadership position in the commu-
nity, it is imperative that the things he says are believed, for if
they are not and he is viewed in the eyes of others as unreliable, he
may not be able to maintain his followers. When such a person has
had his believability falsely attacked by written, published state-
ments, the significance of this aspect of reputation becomes appar-
ent and warrants a call for restitution. Conversely, a person who
does not rely on his own believability by his peers does not suffer
as great an injury when his believability is falsely attacked. Al-
though he may be entitled to some damages in a libel action,
clearly he has not been injured to the same extent as the individual
in the first example. This distinctive component of believability
needs to be analyzed in libel cases where believability is affected in
order for the historic interest of reputation to continue to be ade-
quately protected.
B. Constitutional Limitations Imposed Upon Libel Law
Although libel law's historical interest was to protect reputa-
tion, a new interest surfaced with the desire to protect the press
and media as they inform citizens on matters of public concern.6
Prior to 1964, American courts tended to favor the protection of an
individual's reputation over the interest in a free press.7 This
trend, however, came to an end when the Supreme Court decided
the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan.8
The Court in Sullivan decided that a state's power to award
damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics
of his official conduct was limited by the constitutional protections
for speech and press afforded by the First Amendment and made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The
Court declared that Alabama law, which provided that "a publica-
tion is 'libelous per se' if the words 'tend to injure a person . . . in
6. This interest is provided by the First Amendment which reads, "Congress shall
make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
This amendment has been interpreted to be applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1937).
7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 804
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEEroN]. See also Mark A. Byrd, Quotations and Actual Malice:
Bridging the Gap Between Fact and Fiction, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 617, 621 (1990).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan concerned a Commissioner of the City of Montgom-
ery, Alabama, who alleged he had been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement
that was run in the New York Times which charged that Black students were being denied
their constitutional right to live in human dignity. Id. at 256-257.
9. Id. at 264.
19931
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his reputation' or 'to bring [him] into public contempt,' '"10
abridged the freedoms of speech and press." The Court felt that
there was a "profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials." 2 It stated furthermore that the Constitution required a rule
that prohibited a public figure from being awarded damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice," or in
other words, that it was made with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' s This new
federal rule resulted in making the libel action for public officials a
very onerous proceeding, effectively making it difficult for those in-
dividuals in the public eye to protect their reputation, and it com-
menced a trend in future libel cases of favoring the interest of en-
suring the free exchange of information to the general public." As
a result of Sullivan, libel law was changed forever and the funda-
mental importance of freedom of the press was manifested.
The Supreme Court further broadened the protection afforded
to the freedom of speech and press when it extended the applica-
tion of the actual malice test to public figures in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts.15 In Curtis Publishing, an athletic director and for-
mer football coach of a state university brought a libel action
against a newspaper for publishing an article which accused the
director of conspiring to "fix" a football game.'" After an extensive
analysis to determine the extent of protection to be afforded to the
guarantee of freedom of speech and press, the Court held that the
director commanded a substantial amount of independent public
interest at the time of the publications, was considered a "public
figure" under ordinary tort rules, and therefore must be subject to
10. Id. at 267.
11. Id. at 268.
12. Id. at 270.
13. Id. at 279-280. The Court reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's decision award-
ing the Commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama $500,000 in damages. Id. at 292. Under the
new constitutional standard, the evidence did not show that the newspaper was aware of
any erroneous statements or was in any way reckless in that regard. Id. at 286.
14. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984); Time v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964).
15. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
16. Id. at 135.
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the "actual malice" standard put forth in Sullivan.7 Furthermore,
the journalist's attempt to put forth information and opinion on
questions of public concern was believed to be a revered activity by
the Court.18
Although the "actual malice" standard after Curtis was clearly
interpreted to include people in the public eye, the term "public
figure" had not been explicitly defined. The Supreme Court ad-
dressed this ambiguity in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 9 The Court
began by recognizing that "[the Court] ... has struggled for nearly
a decade to define the proper accommodation between the law of
defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the
First Amendment. 20 After a lengthy discussion regarding the ap-
propriate protection afforded to authors and publishers when ex-
pressing their sentiments about public officials and public figures,
21
the Court refused to justify the Sullivan and Curtis holdings solely
by reference to the interest of the press.22 It emphasized the im-
portance of the availability of a legal remedy for damaging defama-
tory statements attacking a private individual's reputation. The
Court held that the "actual malice" standard applied to public offi-
cials and public figures only, and that a reputable attorney who
was well known in some circles but "had achieved no general fame
or notoriety in the community,"' 24 was not considered a public fig-
ure in the context of a libel action. 5 Justice Powell defined "public
figures" for the purposes of a libel action as those people who have
become notorious due to their achievements or those who seek the
public's attention with "vigor and success. "2
The Supreme Court further extended the freedom of speech
and press in the criminal libel case of Garrison v. Louisiana.27 The
17. Id. at 154-155.
18. Id. at 150.
19. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
20. Id. at 325.
21. Id. at 344-345.
22. Id. at 343 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)).
23. Id. at 345-346.
24. Id. at 351-352.
25. Id. at 352.
26. Id. at 342.
27. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). This case involved a criminal libel action against the District
Attorney of Orleans Parish, Louisiana after he held a press conference and made ridiculing
comments about eight judges. Id. at 64-65. The Supreme Court reversed the state supreme
court's decision to convict the district attorney. Id. at 67. The Court found Louisiana's crim-
inal libel statute unconstitutional because it punished false statements against public offi-
cials if made with ill will without regard to whether they were made with knowledge of their
19931
5
Hiemstra: <em>Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.</em>: A "Material Alterat
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Court declared at the outset of its decision that the Sullivan rule
was to be extended to criminal libel actions.2 8 It went on to explain
the reckless disregard prong of the actual malice test.2 9 The Court
held, "only those false statements made with the high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity demanded by the New York
Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions." a
This holding further complicated the libel action for a public offi-
cial or figure.
In yet another case, the Supreme Court again addressed the
reckless disregard prong of the "actual malice" standard.3' In St.
Amant v. Thompson, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision en-
tering a judgment for a deputy sheriff in a libel action against a
politician, was reversed because the court had not correctly inter-
preted and applied the Sullivan rule.32 Justice White wrote that
the reckless conduct was not measured by an objective standard,
but rather by a subjective standard. 3 This ruling had the effect of
requiring the public official to submit evidence concluding that the
defendant himself entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication, making the "actual malice" test harder to meet.
III. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
A. The Facts
In 1980, Jeffrey Masson, a psychoanalyst, was hired by Dr.
Kurt Eissler and Anna Freud as Projects Director of the Sigmund
Freud Archives situated on the outskirts of London.34 While work-
ing there, he claimed to have made interesting discoveries regard-
falsity or in reckless disregard of whether they were true or false, or if not made in reasona-
ble belief of their truth. Id. at 78.
28. Id. at 67.
29. Id. at 74.
30. Id.
31. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
32. Id. at 733. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the defendant had broadcast
false information about the deputy sheriff recklessly, though not knowingly. Id. at 730. This
conclusion was justified by the court because the defendant had no personal knowledge of
the plaintiff's activities, he relied solely on a third person, he failed to verify the informa-
tion, he gave no consideration to whether the statements defamed the plaintiff, and he mis-
takenly believed he had no responsibility for the broadcast because he was quoting another's
words. Id.
33. Id. at 731.
34. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2424. The Sigmund Freud
Archives serves as a storage place for materials about Freud, including his own writings,
letters, and personal library. Id.
[Vol. 10:283
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ing material that had been hidden by the psychoanalytic world.3 5
Masson believed that this information led to conclusions that re-
sulted in the destruction of accepted psychoanalytic theories. 36 He
became disillusioned with Freud's psychological principles, and
consequently, at a lecture before the Western New England Psy-
choanalytical Society in Connecticut in 1981, he professed his
growing skepticism of Freud's theories. 7 Subsequently, Masson
was fired as Projects Director of the Freud Archives. 8
Because the admission before the Psychoanalytical Society
and the resulting termination of Masson's employment created a
large commotion in the psychological world, Janet Malcolm, an au-
thor and writer for the New Yorker Magazine, contacted Mr. Mas-
son concerning the writing of a future story on his involvement
with the Archives.39 Masson agreed, and he met with Malcolm to
do several interviews.40 During these exchanges, Malcolm used a
tape recorder to notate what was said."1 She used this data to write
a lengthy article for the New Yorker Magazine.2 After the article
had been submitted to the magazine, an editor called Masson to
verify some of the facts concerning the article.43 According to Mas-
son, he expressed concern about the amount of errors in the
passages read to him, and requested to review them, but was not
given this opportunity.44 The article was published in the magazine
as a two-part series and was later published by Albert A. Knopf,
Inc. as a book.4 5
Following the publication, Masson brought a libel action
against Janet Malcolm, The New Yorker Magazine, and Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc., claiming that misquotations in the article and book
falsely portrayed him as conceited." All parties agreed Masson was






41. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2425.
42. Id. at 2424. In the article, Malcolm used lengthy passages attributed to Masson,
Eissler, and Anna Freud by using quotation marks as a narrative device. Id. The New
Yorker Magazine is a weekly magazine, and was, at the time the article was run, known for
its factual accuracy. Id. at 2431.
43. Id. at 2424.
44. Id. at 2424-2425.
45. Id. at 2425. See JANET MALCOLM, IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1984) (hereinafter IN
THE FREUD ARCHIVES). Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. published the book with knowledge of Mas-
son's allegation that the article contained defamatory material. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425.
46. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
19931
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a public figure.47 In his complaint, Masson identified allegedly
libelous passages and the three defendants moved for summary
judgment."8 The court meticulously reviewed each disputed pas-
sage individually and matched it with the relevant portions of the
tape recorded interviews. 49 Finding no direct evidence of actual
malice, the court entered an order granting the motions for sum-
mary judgment.50 The reason for this conclusion, according to the
court, was that actual malice could not be inferred when the au-
thor's choice of words were rational interpretations of the tape-re-
corded statements. 5
B. The Appellate Court Decision
Masson appealed from this order to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.-" After noting that Masson had
presented evidence that the several quotations attributed to him
did not appear in the tape recordings of his interview with Mal-
colm, the court assumed the quotations were deliberately altered
in order to review the district court's decision. 53 After reviewing
several federal appellate court decisions,54 the Ninth Circuit
turned to the question of whether actual malice could be inferred
from any of the quotations attributed to Masson. Each passage was
reviewed separately, and the circuit court concluded that either the
misquotes did not alter the substantive content of Masson's state-
ments or were rational interpretations of Masson's statements.5
The district court's decision was therefore affirmed. 6
Circuit Judge Kozinski wrote an emphatic dissenting opin-
ion,57 disagreeing with the majority's meaning of quotations.5 8 He
considered quotations to represent not merely extrapolations of
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1398. The court analyzed a total of eight passages. Id. at 1399-1406.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1399.
52. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 1537. The standard of review governing summary judgment in the district
courts in libel actions brought by public figures was described by the Supreme Court in
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). "Where the factual dispute concerns actual
malice .... the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the evidence in the
record could support a reasonable jury finding ... that the plaintiff has shown actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence . Id. at 255-256:
54. Id. at 1537-1539.
55. Id. at 1539-1546.
56. Id. at 1548.
57. Id. at 1548-1570.
58. Id. at 1548.
[Vol. 10:283
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the speaker's words, but "the speaker's own words or something
very close to them. '15  According to Kozinski, the majority had
given a journalist the right to lie by allowing him to expressly alter
what someone else said.60 In addition, he thought the majority had
misinterpreted existing caselaw and that the previous decisions did
not support the rational interpretation test in the Masson situation
at all. 1 He proposed an alternative solution to determine actual
malice in the context of quotations, consisting of a five-step
inquiry:
1) Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repe-
tition of what the speaker said?
2) If so, is it inaccurate?
3) 'If so, is the inaccuracy material?
4) If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory?
5) If so, is the inaccuracy a result of malice, i.e., is it a
fabrication or was it committed in reckless disregard of the
truth?
62
If the response to any of these five questions were to be "no", then,
as a matter of law, the inquiry would stop and the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment would be granted. 3
Although the dissenting opinion protects the speaker more
against misquotation than the majority's holding, each opinion has
been heavily criticized as not putting forth an effective test to de-
termine "actual malice" when misquotation is involved." There is
a uniqueness about quotations that calls for a special standard that
will afford protection to the journalist as he interprets ambiguous
notes and at the same time will guard the speaker's own freedom
of speech and his reputation when he is misquoted. Most law re-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1570.
61. Id. at 1554-1557. The caselaw relied upon by the majority, which Judge Kozinski
claims is misinterpreted, consists of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485 (1984), Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir.
1987), Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977),
and Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
62. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir.
1989)(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
63. See Id.
64. See, e.g., Sarah H. Arnholz, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine: The Question of
Quotations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1566, 1576-1587 (1990); M. Carter Crow, Libel & Slander:
Masson v. The New Yorker: Fabricated Malice, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 543-548 (1990);
Jonathan I. Lessner, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: "Sex, Women, Fun, and Al-
tered Quotations," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159, 186-197 (1990); Michael A. Pavlick, Masson u.
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view articles written on the Court of Appeals decision suggest
other alternatives which purport to strike a more effective balance
between these competing interests.6 Although a discussion of
these alternatives would be helpful in determining an appropriate
test to ascertain "actual malice" in libel cases involving altered
quotations, such an analysis is beyond the focus of this Note.
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
Masson appealed again and the United States Supreme Court,
having never before applied the Sullivan doctrine to a case in
which a defendant allegedly fabricated quotations and attributed
them to a public figure," granted certiorari to hear the case." Mas-
son had dropped some of the passages alleged to be defamatory in
his brief to the Supreme Court, and so the Court had fewer
passages to consider.6 8 The Court commenced by recognizing that a
fabricated quotation might injure a plaintiff in two ways: (1) by
crediting a false factual assertion to the speaker, and/or (2) by at-
tributing, regardless of the truth or falsity of the factual matters
asserted within the quoted statement, a statement whose manner
of expression or the very fact that the statement was made indi-
cates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not
hold.69 After examining each of the passages submitted by Masson,
the Court also noted that no identical statement appeared in the
more than 40 hours of taped interviews.7 0 The majority found that
65. See supra note 64.
66. See M. Carter Crow, Libel & Slander: Masson v. The New Yorker: Fabricated
Malice, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 533 (1990).
67. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990).
68. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2425.
69. Id. at 2430.
70. Id. Specifically, the Court considered six passages which Masson claimed were de-
famatory. The following is a list of the quoted sections as they appear in the book and the
tape-recorded interviews they were derived from:
(1) Book describing Masson's relationship with Eissler and Anna Freud: "'Then I met a
rather attractive older graduate student and I had an affair with her. One day, she took me
to some art event, and she said she was sorry afterward. She said, "Well, it was very nice
sleeping with you in your room, but you're the kind of person who should never leave the
room-you're just a social embarrassment anywhere else, though you do fine in your own
room." And you know, in their way, if not in so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told
me the same thing. They liked me well enough "in my own room." They loved to hear from
me what creeps and dolts analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo-you get your pleasure
from him, but you don't take him out in public ... ' IN THE FREUD ARCHIvEs, supra note
45, at 38. Tape describing relationship: " 'They felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a
public liability .... They liked me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk
and chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a
sense, much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training ana-
[Vol. 10:283
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the Court of Appeals erred by determining that an altered quota-
lysts to be caught dead with me.'" Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2426.
(2) Book describing Masson's plans for Maresfield Gardens, which he had hoped to procure
when Anna Freud died: "'It was a beautiful house, but it was dark and sombre and dead.
Nothing ever went on there. I was the only person who ever came. I would have renovated
it, opened it up, brought it to life. Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholar-
ship, but it would also have been a place of sex, women, fun. It would have been like the
change in The Wizard of Oz, from black-and-white into color.'" IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES,
supra note 45, at 33. Tape notes: "[I1t is an incredible storehouse. I mean, the library,
Freud's library alone is priceless in terms of what it contains: all his books with his annota-
tions in them; the Schreber case annotated, that kind of thing. It's fascinating." Masson,
111 S. Ct. at 2426.
(3) Book concerning Masson's history of his family: "'My father is a gem merchant who
doesn't like to stay in any one place too long. His father was a gem merchant, too - a Bessa-
rabian gem merchant, named Moussaieff, who went to Paris in the twenties and adopted the
name Masson. My parents named me Jeffrey Lloyd Masson, but in 1975 I decided to change
my middle name to Moussaieff - it sounded better.'" IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES, supra note
45, at 36. Tape describing similar statement, "Masson explained at considerable length that
his father had changed the family name from Moussaieff to Masson when living in France,
'[j]ust to hide his jewishness'. [Masson] had changed his name back to Moussaieff, but his
then-wife Terry objected that 'nobody could pronounce it and nobody knew how to spell it,
and it wasn't the name that she knew me by.' [Masson] had changed his name to Moussaieff
because he 'just liked it.' '[I]t was sort of part of analysis: a return to the roots, and your
family tradition and so on.'" Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2426.
(4) Book recounting a conversation between Masson and Malcolm about the paper Masson
presented at his 1981 New Haven lecture: "[I] asked him what had happened between the
time of the lecture and the present to change him from a Freudian psychoanalyst with
somewhat outr6 views into the bitter and belligerent anti-Freudian he had become." "Mas-
son sidestepped my question. 'You're right, there was nothing disrespectful of analysis in
that paper,' he said. 'That remark about the sterility of psychoanalysis was something I
tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratuitous. I don't know why I put it in.' "IN
THE FREUD ARCHIVES, supra note 45, at 53-54. Tape recording contains a different discus-
sion: "Masson: 'So they really couldn't judge the material. And, in fact, until the last sen-
tence I think they were quite fascinated. I think the last sentence was an in, [sic] possibly,
gratuitously offensive way to end a paper to a group of analysts. Uh,-' Malcolm: 'What were
the circumstances under which you put in the [in]? .. .' Masson: 'That it was, was true... I
really believe it. I didn't believe anyone would agree with me . . .But I felt I should say
something because the paper's still well within the analytic tradition in a sense ... It's
really not a deep criticism of Freud. It contains all the material that would allow one to
criticize Freud but I didn't really do it. And then I thought, I really must say one thing that
I really believe, that's not going to appeal to anybody and that was the very last sentence.
Because I really do believe psychoanalysis is entirely sterile . Masson, 111 S. Ct. at
2427.
(5) Book: "A few days after my return to New York, Masson, in a state of elation, tele-
phoned me to say that Farrar Straus & Giroux has taken The Assault on Truth [Masson's
book]. 'Wait till it reaches the best-seller list, and watch how the analysts will crawl,' he
crowed. 'They move whichever way the wind blows. They will want me back, they will say
that Masson is a great scholar, a major analyst-after Freud, he's the greatest analyst who
ever lived. Suddenly they'll be calling, begging, cajoling: "Please take back what you've said
about our profession-our patients are quitting." They'll try a short smear campaign, then
they'll try to buy me, and ultimately they'll have to shut up. Judgment will be passed by
history. There is no possible refutation of this book. It's going to cause a revolution in psy-
choanalysis. Analysis stands or falls with me now.'" IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES, supra note 45,
1993]
11
Hiemstra: <em>Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.</em>: A "Material Alterat
Published by Institutional Repository, 1993
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
tion is protected provided the alteration is a rational interpretation
of the actual declaration.71 The Court decided that, although much
of the Court of Appeals' decision was based on the reasoning that
substantial truth is needed when quoting a speaker, the lower
court went too far by ruling that an altered quotation is protected
by the First Amendment as long as it is an author's rational inter-
pretation of the speaker's actual declaration. 72 The Court held that
the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted the higher court's decision in
the libel case of Time, Inc. v. Pape 7 by applying the rational in-
terpretation test stated in that case, which did not concern quota-
tions, to the situation of fabricated quotations.7 4 The rational in-
terpretation test, according to the Court, only affords First
at 162. Tape on related topic: "' . . . I assure you when that book comes out, which I
honestly believe is an honest book, there is nothing, you know, mean-minded about it. It's
the honest fruit of research and intellectual toil. And there is not an analyst in the country
who will say a single word in favor of it.' 'Talk to enough analysts and get them right down
to these concrete issues and you watch how different it is from my position. It's utterly the
opposite and that's finally what I realized, that I hold a position that no other analyst holds,
including, alas, Freud. At first I thought: Okay, it's me and Freud against the rest of the
analytic
world . . . Not so, it's me. It's me alone.'"
(6) Book on Masson's termination: "'[Eissler] was always putting moral pressure on me.
"Do you want to poison Anna Freud's last days? Have you no heart? You're going to kill the
poor old woman." I said to him, "What have I done? You're doing it. You're firing me. What
am I supposed to do-be grateful to you?" "You could be silent about it. You could swallow
it. I know it is painful for you. But you could just live with it in silence." "Why should I do
that?" "Because it is the honorable thing to do." Well, he had the wrong man.'" IN THE
FREUD ARCHIVES, supra note 45, at 67.' Tape contains relatively the same conversation as in
the beginning of quote in the book, but the book quote deletes much: "'..."You fired me.
What am I supposed to do: Thank you? be grateful to you?" He said, "Well you could never
talk about it .... I know it's painful for you but just live with it in silence." "Fuck you," I
said, "Why should I do that? You know, why should one do that?" "Because it's the honora-
ble thing to do and you will save face. And who knows? If you never speak about it and you
quietly and humbly accept our judgment, who knows that in a few years if we don't bring
you back?" Well, he had the wrong man.'" Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2428.
71. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991).
72. Id.
73. 401 U.S. 279 (1971). In this case, a Chicago police officer filed a libel action against
a magazine, based on an article which had discussed a report on police brutality by the
United States Commission on Civil Rights. Id. at 281. The article had reported as a Com-
mission finding of brutality, material which had only appeared in the Commission's report
as a description of allegations of brutality in a private civil rights action against the police
officer. Id. at 281-282. The Supreme Court held that the magazine was not to be held liable,
because it had not engaged in a falsification sufficient to create a jury issue of actual malice.
Id. at 289. The author of the article had stated that the context of the report of the brutal-
ity incident indicated to him that the Commission believed that the incident had occurred
as described. Id. The court reasoned, "Time's omission of the word 'alleged' amounted to
the adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document that
bristled with ambiguities." Id. at 290.
74. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2433.
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Amendment protection to authors when they are relying on ambig-
uous sources. 75 This test does not apply to situations where a
writer utilizes a quotation to convey what the speaker said and a
reasonable reader would interpret the quotation as such.7' The
Court recognized the danger of allowing the rational interpretation
test to stand by saying, "[w]ere we to assess quotations under a
rational interpretation standard, we would give journalists the
freedom to place statements in their subjects' mouths without fear
of liability. 7 7 The Court accordingly enunciated a different test,
holding that a deliberate alteration of words uttered by a plaintiff
will equate to the knowledge of falsity required by Sullivan if the
alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by
the statement. 8
Applying this new test, the Court, for the purposes of the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment, assumed that Masson
had not made the declarations attributed to him in Malcolm's arti-
cle, and that Malcolm wrote the passages with knowledge or reck-
less disregard of the differences between what Masson had said
when interviewed and what was quoted. 79 Next, it surveyed the six
passages at issue, and found that the jury could find actual malice
in all but one.80 The Court then reversed the Court of Appeals'
judgment. 1
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE MASSON DECISION ON LIBEL LAW
A. The Continued Protection of Reputation and of the Press
The Supreme Court's new test, granting First Amendment
protection to inaccurate quotations that do not materially alter the
meaning of what was actually said by the speaker,82 clearly contin-
75. Id. at 2434.
76. Id.
77. Id. The Court also noted, "By eliminating any method of distinguishing between
the statements of the subject and the interpretation of the author, we would diminish to a
great degree the trustworthiness of the printed word, and eliminate the real meaning of
quotations. Not only public figures but the press doubtless would suffer under such a rule.
Newsworthy figures might become more wary of journalists, knowing that any comment
could.be transmuted and attributed to the subject, so long as some bounds of rational inter-
pretation were not exceeded." Id.
78. Id. at 2433.
79. Id. at 2435.
80. Id. at 2435-2437. The passage found not to materially alter the meaning of Mas-
son's statement was the one describing Masson's acquisition of the name of Moussaieff. See
supra note 70.
81. Id. at 2437.
82. Id. at 2433.
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ues the historic protection of reputation. A public figure, if quoted
as saying something which a reader believes to be the public fig-
ure's own words, cannot have his reputation harmed unless he in-
tentionally makes an egotistical, derogatory, or offensive declara-
tion. If the public figure makes an impudent remark and it is
quoted, the action of libel is not available to him, for there has
been no invasion by a third party of his interest in his reputation
and good name.8 3 The author has not materially altered the mean-
ing of what was in reality stated by the speaker. The speaker has
libeled himself, in a sense. In this situation, one has no problem
concluding that the press has an overriding interest in conveying
the declaration to the public. If a free society is to operate success-
fully, the public must have access to all relevant information con-
cerning all activities carried on in that society.84
This concept is easily understood by reference to an example:
A politician will be running in an upcoming election. If there is
something he has said which may affect a person's vote on election
day, a free society compels disclosure of the politician's declara-
tion. In the above situation, he has willingly made a declaration,
and therefore publications relating to his statement can in no way
wrongfully harm his reputation.
The overriding interest of the press in conveying the declara-
tion to the public is not changed when the declarations are not the
speaker's exact words, but the quotation published does not mate-
rially alter the meaning of what was said. This is again based upon
the premise that, in this situation, the speaker's reputation is not
wrongfully harmed. Conversely, when a speaker is falsely quoted
and the meaning he originally meant to convey has been changed,
and this change in meaning results in harm to his reputation, the
interest of the press is no longer controlling. In. this situation, the
historical interest in protecting reputation prevails.
Presumably, the Supreme Court seems to have struck a per-
fect balance between the two competing interests. Authors and
publishers may still use quotations and are not strictly limited to
correcting their grammar and syntax, 5 and public figures' concern
in their reputations allows them recovery if false quotations are
imputed to them which do not convey the originally intended
meaning. However, in the Masson case, due to the unique situation
83. See KEETON, § 113, at 780.
84. Id. at 804. See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354 (1946) (stating
"[w]ithout a free press, there can be no free society.").
85. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2431.
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of altered quotations, a third interest is given protection by the
Court, which will be discussed below.
B. Protection of the Speaker's Freedom of Speech
In libel cases, the press undoubtedly has a constitutional privi-
lege that has been granted by the First Amendment. 6 However,
the First Amendment grants freedom of speech to everyone, not
just the press.8 7 Because quotation marks signal to the average
reader that the author is asserting the speaker's actual words,8"
quotation marks around a statement signify individual expres-
sion.a9 This individual expression, it has been reasoned, should be
afforded equal First Amendment protection as is furnished to the
author who chose to quote it.9" The Supreme Court's new test for
determining actual malice in the case of altered quotations affords
a balance between these two competing concerns. By allowing an
action for libel to defeat summary judgment if quotations materi-
ally alter the speaker's intended meaning, the speaker's freedom of
speech is adequately, although not completely protected. In many
cases, this adequate protection is beneficial to the speaker because
an author is given the freedom to alter an indisputable misstate-
ment made by the speaker. 91
In addition, the author is granted the liberty of altering the
quotation as long as the meaning conveyed to a reasonable reader
is not modified. This is significant because, as the Court in Masson
wrote:
Even if a journalist has tape recorded the spoken statement of a
public figure, the full and exact statement will be reported in
only rare circumstances. The existence of both a speaker and a
reporter; the translation between two media, speech and the
printed word; the addition of punctuation; and the practical ne-
cessity to edit and make intelligible a speaker's perhaps ram-
bling comments, all make it misleading to suggest that a quota-
86. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
87. See supra note 6.
88. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1558 (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting)("What someone says is a fact no less than what someone does."); see also Patricia
H. Webb, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc: Inadequate Protection Against Altered
Quotations, 69 TEX. L. REV. 473, 482-483 (1990).
89. See Webb, supra note 88, at 483.
90. Id.
91. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 2432. The Court stated:
"[Ilf a speaker makes an obvious misstatement, for example by unconscious substitution of
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tion will be reconstructed with complete accuracy.2
C. Protection of Believability
In the context of a libel case involving altered quotations, mis-
quoting a public figure may harm more than the public figure's
general reputatidn in the community and his freedom of speech.
His believability may also be adversely affected if he is misquoted
and later the quoted statement is proven inaccurate. The readers
of the misquotation will assume that the statement within the quo-
tation marks are the actual factual assertions made by the speaker.
The result of this assumption is that the facts within the quota-
tion, if they are later proven to be false, will harm the speaker's
characteristic trait of believability.
An example will facilitate discussion on this point: A politician
is running in an upcoming election. He is interviewed by a reporter
and asked the question, "Have you ever had extramarital rela-
tions?" The politician answers, "No comment". Although the Mas-
son holding forbids the reporter to change the material meaning of
this statement when quoting the politician, the reporter neverthe-
less misquotes the politician as having said, "I have never had an
extramarital affair." Under these circumstances, the politician will
defeat a motion for summary judgment in a libel action under the
Masson holding, for his statement to the reporter was not accu-
rately relayed in the quotation attributed to him." Referring again
to the example, it is one thing for a politician to have been quoted
as admitting having had extramarital relations when he has in real-
ity not had them. In this case, the politician's reputation has been
wrongfully attacked by a quote attributed to him. Most voters will
be influenced by such a false quote, and might prejudge the politi-
cian as a candidate lacking morality. Under such circumstances,
the politician may rightfully bring a libel action against the author
or publisher of the false quotation to redress harm to his
reputation.
However, the Masson holding, when applied to a variation of
these facts, goes too far. The kind of harm to a politician's status is
different when he has been misquoted regarding the extramarital
relations and it is later proven that the misquotation itself is false,
but the underlying facts asserted in the misquotation are true. For
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ever had an extramarital affair?" and the politician answers, "I re-
fuse to answer such an offensive question," but he is quoted in a
newspaper article as having denied involvement in extramarital af-
fairs, under the Masson test the politician could defeat a motion
for summary judgment, and possibly collect a large jury verdict
even if he had in reality had an extramarital affair. If the public
later found out that he had engaged in extramarital relations, only
the believability aspect of the politician's reputation has been ad-
versely affected. This premise becomes clear when one considers
that if he had not initially been misquoted, and his true answer, "I
refuse to answer such an offensive question," had been printed, but
the press had exposed his extramarital relations when they were
later discovered, his reputation would still have been harmed.
However, in this instance, the harm was not wrongful. An action
for libel would not be available to him under these facts.
Society's interest in the free flow of information to the public
becomes important in light of this example. Assuming the partici-
pation in extramarital relations is publicly considered immoral, a
democratic society compels disclosure of such acts in order to en-
able voters to make an informed choice in an election. Harm done
solely to the public figure's believability therefore should not be
given equal weight as harm done to his entire reputation when
falsely quoted. If a politician is allowed a potentially large recovery
against an author or publisher for the publication of false quota-
tions which assert true factual contents, the press will be deterred
from supplying our society with valuable information. This is not
to say that an author should be allowed to misquote a public fig-
ure. An author who misquotes should still be subject to liability,
for he has harmed the public figure. However, the recovery availa-
ble to the public figure who has only had his believability attacked
should be considerably less than that available to a public figure
who has had other aspects of his reputation wrongfully attacked.
This argument becomes clear when one views the harm to believa-
bility not as a separate interest, different from the interest in repu-
tation, but as a small component thereof. When only a part of his
reputation has been injured, the amount of damages the libel
plaintiff is able to recover should not be equal to that amount ob-
tainable when his entire reputation has been wrongfully harmed.
The Masson decision does not make a distinction between the
interest in reputation and the subinterest in believability. Al-
though the facts of Masson may not have made the necessary dis-
tinction between an interest in reputation and one in believability
apparent because the supposed fabricated published quotations al-
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legedly harmed more than Jeffrey Masson's believability, it is im-
perative that in cases where only the believability aspect of a pub-
lic figure's reputation is harmed, this distinction be made. If the
distinction is not made, then libel plaintiffs will have easier access
to juries as well as large jury verdicts. The Masson holding will
subsequently make it is easier for libel plaintiffs to defeat a motion
for summary judgment. 4 This result is dreaded by the press be-
cause, statistically, once a libel action comes before a jury, the
press ends up paying damages more often than not. 5 Additionally,
juries are known for their large awards of damages in libel cases. 6
The consequential effect of Masson, rather than balancing the
press' interest in freedom of speech and the individual's interest in
his reputation, will be a return to favoring the individual's interest
in his reputation.
A possible solution to regain the balance sought by the Su-
preme Court between the interest of reputation and freedom of the
press is to preclude the plaintiff's right to punitive damages where
the harm inflicted by a misquote is solely destructive to his/her
believability. This will result in libel actions being brought only by
individuals whose interest in this aspect of their reputation is so
important to them that they are willing to risk high court costs and
attorney's fees in order to receive public vindication of their believ-
ability. In addition, an author will be deterred from publishing
false quotations, because he will still face potential liability and
possible costly litigation fees.
V. CONCLUSION
An author's misquotation of a speaker's words is often inter-
preted by readers as the actual words the speaker meant to convey.
This implicates both free speech and reputational interests. In or-
der to balance these interests consistently with previous decisions,
the Supreme Court in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. re-
jected the Ninth Circuit's rational interpretation standard and for-
94. See James A. Goodale, A Sigh of Relief?, 205 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1991).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985)(ury award for $50,000 compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages af-
firmed); K-Mart Corp. v. Weston, 530 So. 2d 736 (Ala. 1988)(jury award for $5,000 compen-
satory damages and $15,000 punitive damages affirmed); Sheeran v. Colpo, 460 A.2d 522
(Del. 1983)(award for $9,000 general damages and $12,000 punitive damages affirmed);
Georgia Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, Inc. v. Anderson, 363 S.E.2d 140 (Ga. 1987) (award for
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mulated its own test to determine "actual malice" in a libel action
by applying a material alteration standard. The effect of this hold-
ing, however, is the blanket protection of the interest in reputa-
tion, without taking into consideration the subcategory of believa-
bility. This results in the conclusion that believability and
reputation should be afforded equal protection. Believability is but
a mere component of reputation and should therefore not be af-
forded identical protection.
In order to prevent awards of large, unwarranted damages to
plaintiffs and to protect the press while it informs the public on
matters of interest, it is imperative to recognize a distinction be-
tween an individual's interest in his reputation as a whole and an
individual's subinterest in his believability. When only the aspect
of a plaintiff's believability has been harmed by defamation, puni-
tive damages should not be made available to him. By allowing
only public vindication of his believability, a public figure who has
been wrongfully attacked will be adequately protected. In addition,
it will preserve society's interest in the free flow of information by
not exposing the press to unlimited liability.
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